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Abstract 
Combining large (up to 25%) extracts of five French censuses and data from Labor Force 
Surveys for 1968-1999, we use Borjas (2003)’s factor proportions methodology for France and 
find that a 10 p.p. increase in the immigrant share raises natives’ wages by 3.3%, which is in 
stark contrast with the results in Borjas (2003) for the U.S. The positive impact of immigration 
on natives’ wages and employment is shown to hold also at the regional level. We find evidence 
that this positive correlation partly comes from the imperfect substitutability of natives and 
immigrants within education/experience cells. Specifically, (i) the occupational distribution of 
natives and immigrants within these cells is more dissimilar when there are more immigrants in 
the cell; (ii) natives tend to perform more abstract tasks when there are more immigrants in the 
cell; and (iii) an important part of the positive relation between immigration and wages comes 
from a reallocation of natives to better-paid occupations within the cells. However, we argue 
that this positive correlation is also likely to be related to the inability of the Borjas (2003) 
model to perfectly account for the important changes in the wage distribution and the 
educational level characterizing the French economy in this period. 
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Introduction 
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in the research on the impact of immigration on the 
labor market outcomes of natives. Until the 1990s, the methodology exploited the variation in 
the share of immigrants across geographical locations.1 After Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997) 
underlined some potential problems of this approach,2
The dimension that has attracted most attention is the education/experience dimension, as 
proposed initially by Borjas (2003). This approach assumes that natives and immigrants within 
education/experience cells are perfect substitutes, and uses the variation in the immigrant share 
at the cell level over time to identify the impact of immigration. Using this model, and in 
contrast with the previous literature, Borjas (2003) finds a large negative impact of immigration 
on natives’ wages in the U.S. Since then, a series of papers have suggested different 
modifications or refinements of Borjas (2003)
 a new strand of literature has proposed 
to measure the impact of immigration by relating the variation over time at the national level in 
the number of specific groups of immigrants with the outcomes of the natives with similar 
characteristics. 
3 while other papers have obtained for different 
European countries4
                                                 
1 See e.g. Card (1990), Altonji and Card (1991) or Hunt (1992). The consensus was that the effect of immigration on natives was small, see for 
instance Friedberg and Hunt (1995) or Borjas (1994). 
 small coefficients more in line with results of the spatial correlations 
literature. However, an important limitation of this last set of papers is that their estimates are 
likely to be attenuated by the short time periods and small sample sizes under consideration (see 
Aydemir and Borjas, 2011). 
2 Borjas et al. (1997) argues that this approach may understate the impact of immigration because (i) natives may respond to immigrant inflows 
by moving out to other locations, which would diffuse the impact of migration across locations but would not be captured in a spatial 
correlation approach, and (ii) immigrants may choose the best locations, which would result in reverse causality. For a paper treating these 
biases, see Pischke and Velling (1997). Recent evidence on the response of natives to immigrations flows is relatively mixed, see Card and 
DiNardo (2000), Card (2001) and Borjas (2006). 
3 Aydemir and Borjas (2007) finds also an impact of similar magnitude for Canada and Mexico. Card (2009) argues that, in the U.S.case, a 
model with four groups of education (high-school dropouts, high-school graduates, individuals with some college, and college graduates) as 
in Borjas (2003) or Borjas and Katz (2007) does not fit well the data. 
4 See Bonin (2005), Steinhart (2011) and Bauer, Flake and Sinning (2011), for Germany; Carrasco, Jimeno and Ortega (2008), for Spain; and 
Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2005) for the U.K. 
3 
In this paper, we use the factor proportion approach to examine the impact of immigration 
in France over a time period of 30 years -- from 1968 to 1999.5
In addition, the characteristics of the French labor market in the period under consideration 
are interesting for three reasons. First, institutions such as the minimum wage and a more 
centralized wage bargaining still play a large role in France, as in other European labor markets. 
In such a context, the impact of immigration might not be similar to that in the -more flexible- 
U.S. labor market. Second, during the period under consideration, France and the U.S. had 
contrasting evolutions in the educational attainment of their labor forces, with a pretty stable 
relative supply of young skilled workers in the U.S. after 1975 and instead an important 
increase in France during the same period. Finally, the variations in the immigrant share across 
groups and over time observed in France are large but quite different from the ones experienced 
in the U.S.: in particular, the largest inflows of unskilled immigrants into France took place in 
the 1960s and 1970s, a period of declining wage inequality with large increases in the wages of 
unskilled workers (see Verdugo, 2014). Instead, in the U.S., the largest inflows took place in the 
1990s and the 2000s, when wage inequality was expanding. For these reasons, we believe that 
France provides a very good ground to understand if the large negative coefficients in Borjas 
(2003) extend to European countries and more generally to assess the robustness of this model 
to different time and cross-sectional variations. 
 The first reason for focusing on 
France is the quality of the data. Indeed, in contrast with previous studies for European 
countries, we can exploit larger Census extracts (up to 25%) than in Borjas (2003) for a 
comparable period of time, which makes the results immune to attenuation biases.  
In the baseline specification à la Borjas (2003), we find that a 10 p.p. increase in the 
immigrant share is associated with an increase in wages by 3.3% and an increase in 
employment rates by 2.6%. Such positive association of immigration with wages and 
                                                 
5 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper applying a factor proportion approach to France. Hunt (1992) studies the impact of 
immigration on natives exploiting the spatial variation in the settlement of the repatriates from Algeria in 1962. 
4 
employment is not what one would expect in a competitive model after an immigration-driven 
rightward shift of the labor supply curve and sharply contrasts with Borjas (2003)’s results. Our 
results are shown to be robust to different alternative specifications. Specifically, when 
instrumenting with the settlement pattern of immigrants across 21 French regions, the impact of 
immigration on wages is still found to be positive and significant, with associated estimates 
quite close to the national-level estimates. 
We next check the extent to which the positive correlation between wages and immigration 
can be explained by an imperfect substitutability of immigrants and natives within 
education/experience cells.6
We find evidence supporting this kind of story along three lines. First, we show that the 
degree of similarity of the distributions of natives and immigrants within education/experience 
cells is negatively related to the share of immigrants in the cell. This last result indicates that the 
presence of immigrants favors the relative specialization of natives with respect to immigrants 
within the cell. 
  Indeed, assume that natives within a given education/experience 
cell self-select à la Roy (1951) across tasks, and instead that immigrants are (initially) confined 
to routine tasks characterized by a relatively low use of language skills. In the presence of 
q-complementarity between tasks à la Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), an inflow of 
immigrants to the routine tasks generates a further specialization of natives into nonroutine 
(language-intensive) tasks. This specialization should increase the wages of natives in the 
nonroutine task through q-complementarity, and increase the wages of the natives moving from 
routine to nonroutine tasks. However, the effect on the average wage of natives remains 
ambiguous given that the natives staying in routine tasks end up with lower wages. 
                                                 
6 Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) for the U.K. and Ottaviano and Peri (2012) for the U.S. estimate a multi-level CES production 
function and conclude that natives and immigrants within education/experience cells are imperfect substitutes. However, Borjas, Grogger and 
Hanson (2008, 2012) argue that one cannot reject that immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes in the U.S. case. 
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Second, we build on the task content literature7
Third, we decompose the change in natives’ wages into changes associated to the 
reallocation of natives across occupations within education/experience cells and changes in the 
wages for a constant occupational distribution. We show that native reallocation across 
occupations accounts for a large part of the overall impact on the wage, which further supports 
the imperfect substitutability argument. 
 and show that a higher share of immigrants 
in the cell is associated with a decline in the average routine intensity of natives’ occupations 
and a higher specialization of natives in abstract tasks relative to immigrants. This suggests that 
natives move to tasks which are complement to the routine tasks performed by immigrants. 
Importantly, and unlike previous work such as Peri and Sparber (2009), this relation holds both 
at the national and at the regional level, and without restricting the analysis to low-skilled 
workers, i.e. for all educational groups. 
In explaining the contrast between our estimates and Borjas (2003)’s, this argument might 
not be the full story. Indeed, the decomposition also shows that immigration strongly and 
positively impacts natives’ wages even when holding the occupational distribution constant. 
Absent an additional explanation, this result is a little bit surprising given that the positive 
impact of immigration on wages through q-complementarity should anyway be (at least partly) 
offset by the downward pressure on wages stemming from the inflow of natives into nonroutine 
occupations and the inflow of immigrants into routine occupations. 
We argue that a complementary explanation to the contrast between our estimates and 
Borjas (2003)’s be found in the different evolutions of the French and U.S. labor markets. First, 
accounting for the important increase in the educational attainment of natives characterizing 
                                                 
7 See in particular Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Goos and Manning (2007), Black and Spitz-Oener (2010), or  Acemoglu and Autor 
(2011) for papers on the demand for job skills, and Peri and Sparber (2009), Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011), Prantl and Spitz-Oener 
(2011) or Imai, Stacey and Warman (2012) for papers specifically interested in immigration. In particular, Peri and Sparber (2009) and 
Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011) provide evidence across respectively US states and Spanish regions that low-skilled natives respond to 
immigration by specializing in language-intensive tasks for which they have a comparative advantage and which are better remunerated than 
manual-physical tasks. 
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France in that period by controlling for the number of natives in the cells reduces by roughly 
one third the magnitude of the estimated effect of the immigrant share on wages – and does not 
change much in Borjas (2003) given the relative stability of natives’ educational attainment in 
the U.S. Second, in the pre-1975 period characterized in France by high levels of low-educated 
immigration and declining wage inequality, we obtain an unrealistically large impact of 
immigration on wages, which is likely to come from the imperfect absorption of the demand 
shocks by the fixed effects. Instead, for the rest of the period, characterized by lower 
immigration and more stable inequality in the lower tail of the distribution, the impact of 
immigration on wages is statistically insignificant. This type of result casts some doubts on the 
ability of the Borjas (2003) model to properly identify the impact of immigration on wages 
when the wage distribution itself is not stable over time for reasons unlikely to be related to 
immigration and which might actually be instead driving it. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 describes the data and Section 2 
presents education/experience regressions to assess the impact of immigration on the labor 
market outcomes of natives. Next, Section 3 studies the relation between immigration and the 
occupational distribution of natives (versus immigrants) within education/experience cells. 
Finally, Section 4 discusses why the impact of immigration on wages estimated using French 
data differs so widely with respect to the impact obtained with U.S. data. 
1 Data 
We use data from five successive French censuses from 1968 to 1999 (1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 
and 1999) to compute the number of immigrants and natives with a given level of education and 
labor market experience in each year. 
As common in the literature (see for instance Borjas, 2003, or Manacorda et al., 2012), we 
restrict our attention for most of our estimates to males aged 18-64. Men are classified into four 
7 
educational groups depending on their highest attained diploma: no education or primary 
education (at most 8 or 9 years of education), completed secondary education (between 10 and 
11 years), high school (12 or 13 years), and college (at least 14 years).8
Table 1 shows the evolution of the educational composition of the male French labor force 
over the period. The most striking feature is that the share of individuals with only primary 
education decreased from about 68% in 1968 to 24.5% in 1999, while the share of individuals 
with high-school or college diploma rapidly increased. 
  
Labor market experience is measured as the age of the individual minus the entry age into 
the labor market. As the entry age into the labor market is not observed, we assume that 
individuals with primary, secondary, high school, and college education enter the labor market 
respectively when 15, 16, 19, and 21 years old. In addition, we restrict the analysis to 
individuals between 1 and 40 years of labor market experience. For each education level, we 
group individuals in 5-years experience groups. 
Following Borjas (2003), the immigration shock experienced by natives with education i  
and experience j  at year t  can be measured by ijtp , the relative share of immigrants among 
all individuals in the cell: 
 / ( ),ijt ijt ijt ijtp M M N= +  
where ijtN  and ijtM  respectively denote the number of natives and the number of immigrants 
in the corresponding cell. Figure 1 reports ijtp  for the male population between 1968 and 1999 
as computed from the Census data. From this figure, it appears that the evolution of the share of 
immigrants over time greatly varies across educational groups. For individuals with primary 
education, the share first rises and then declines. Instead, the share of immigrants among 
individuals with secondary education rises over the period, although not always in a monotonic 
                                                 
8 Appendix 1 provides a detailed match between reported diplomas in the censuses and our educational groups. We follow here the diploma 
classification which serves as a reference for French labor relations. A category “some college” cannot be constructed for the entire sample 
period as data on uncompleted college (“Bac+2” and “Bac+3”) is only available since 1982. However, given the relatively low educational 
level of the French labor force at the beginning of the sixties, such distinction is not fundamental for the period of time under consideration. 
8 
fashion. Finally, for higher educational levels (high school and college graduates), and in 
contrast with the evolution for primary education, the share of immigrants generally decreases 
until 1982 and then rises in the 80s and the 90s. 
Since the French Census does not include information on income or wages, we rely on 
other surveys to construct our wage sample. As no information on wages is available at all for 
1968 and 1975, the best approximation is the 1969 and 1976 data on annual wage income 
available in the 1970 and 1977 Enquête Formation et Qualification Professionnelles (FQP). 
For 1982, 1990, and 1999, the best available information on wages is given by the 
corresponding French Labor Force Survey (LFS), which provides information since 1982 on 
monthly wages in the month preceding the survey month.  
Using the LFS and FQP data, we compute the average log monthly wage of natives and 
convert it into 2007 Euros using the CPI deflator from the French Statistical Institute (INSEE). 
Average log wages per experience and education level over the period are reported in Table 2. 
The picture for wages over time is quite simple and uniform across education/experience cells. 
Indeed, with few exceptions, wages rise during the period 1968-1976 and then decrease 
throughout the 1976-1999 period. 
2 Immigration and Labor Market Outcomes of Natives 
This section presents regressions at the education/experience level to try to identify the relation 
between immigration and natives’ labor market outcomes. Specifically, Section 2.1 presents the 
estimates of the Borjas (2003) specification, and Section 2.2 presents the estimates of models 
identified using additional geographical variations. 
2.1 Borjas model 
The initial specification from Borjas (2003) relates the labor market outcomes of natives to the 
immigrant share across education/experience groups as follows:  
9 
 ijt ijt FE ijty pθ ψ ϕ= + +   (1) 
where ijty  is a labor market outcome at period t  for natives with education i  and experience 
j , ijtp  is the immigrant share, and FEψ  is a set of education, time, and experience fixed 
effects s  with their corresponding interactions i.e.  
 ( ) ( ) ( )FE i j t i j i t j ts s s s s s s s sψ = + + + × + × + × . 
The set of fixed effects included in the model should absorb the impact of demand shocks to 
different education/experience groups unrelated with changes in the immigrant share. If this is 
not the case, our estimates are biased if unobserved changes in labor demand are correlated with 
the immigrant share.9
Table 3 presents estimates of (1) using OLS or WLS. In the baseline case (row 1), and in 
contrast with Borjas (2003), the immigrant share is found to be positively and significantly 
correlated with the average log monthly wage (column 1), the employment to population ratio 
(column 2), and the employment to labor force ratio (column 3). Quantitatively, the estimated 
impact is quite large: a 10 p.p. increase in the immigration share is estimated to raise native’s 
wages by 3.3%, the employment/population ratio by 3.1%, and the employment/labor force 
ratio by 2.6%. In terms of elasticities as defined in Borjas (2003), this means in particular that a 
10% exogenous increase in labor supply attributable to immigration raises natives’ wages by 
2.8%.
 
10
                                                 
9 Ottaviano and Peri (2012) argue that such a saturated model might absorb most of the identifying variations necessary to estimate the model. 
We remain conservative and include the full set of fixed effects and interactions between education, experience and time in all the models 
estimated in this paper following Borjas (2003) and Borjas et al. (2008). This guarantees that our estimates are not biased by potential changes 
in the overall returns to education or experience over time. Another hypothesis necessary for the correct identification of the model is that 
natives do not change their education level over time in response to actual or anticipated future variations of immigrants’ flows. Hunt (2010) 
shows that immigration has a relatively small effect on educational levels in the U.S. More recently, Eberhard (2012) and Jackson (2011) 
have found larger effects. 
 
10 To go from the estimate to an elasticity, we follow Borjas (2003) and define the “wage elasticity” as 
2log / / (1 )w m mθ∂ ∂ = +  
where m is the relative number of immigrants to natives. Over the period, m is about 9%, and the wage elasticity is thus obtained by 
multiplying the estimate (.33) by 0.84.  
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Row 2 indicates that the results are qualitatively similar when the regressions are 
unweighted with the exception that the estimated positive correlation with employment rates is 
substantially larger. 
Figure 2 illustrates how well the model fits the data. The figure plots the residuals from the 
regression of wages on the fixed effects and the residuals of the immigrant share on the fixed 
effects, together with the regression line. From the figure, the results do not appear to be driven 
by specific observations. 
A first concern for the validity of these initial estimates is that changes in participation rates 
and wages across demographic groups over this period might be spuriously correlated with 
variations of the immigrant share. Although France and the U.S. experienced similar 
employment-population ratios during the 60s, the employment-population ratio in France 
dramatically fell after that period both for both young workers (under 25) and old workers 
(above 55). In order to account for non-random labor force participation differences, Row 3 
uses natives and immigrants from the entire population instead of labor force participants only 
when calculating ijtp , and this yields virtually identical estimates. In turn, Row 4 eliminates 
from the sample the cells of less than 11 years of experience and more than 30 years of 
experience. In that case, the estimated effects of immigration on log wages and employment 
rates are slightly lower but remain positive and significant. 
A second issue is that the impact of immigration could differ across education groups. 
However, the estimates in Row 5 for low education levels (primary or secondary education 
only) still display a positive and significant correlation for all three endogenous variables.11
Row 6 shows that the coefficients remain similar when we exclude from the analysis the 
individuals with less than 10 years of experience, for which the prevalence of the minimum 
 
                                                 
11 The estimated impact of immigration for the individuals with more than secondary education only (not reported) is very small and 
negative but never significantly different from zero. 
11 
wage is very important, especially after 1975.12
As men and women clearly do not constitute two disjoint segments of the labor market, 
Rows 7 and 8 provide estimates when data for women are included in the regressions. 
Specifically, Row 7 measures both the immigrant share and the dependent variable including 
data for women, while Row 8 keeps an immigrant share defined only for men but includes 
women in the endogenous variable. On the whole, including females does not alter qualitative 
results, although the coefficient on the employment to population ratio becomes insignificant in 
Row 7. However, including women in the measure of the immigrant share may be problematic 
due to the lower participation rate of immigrant women and the important increase over the 
period of the participation rate of female natives. Similarly, changes in the selection of women 
that participate to the labor market (see Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008, and Olivetti and 
Petrongolo, 2008) may render difficult the interpretation of the coefficient associated to the 
wage when the wages of women are included in the computation of the native’s wage. For these 
reasons, we follow the rest of the literature and stick to regressions only for males in the rest of 
the paper. 
 The minimum wage is thus unlikely to be the 
main factor behind the positive correlation between immigration and natives’ labor market 
outcomes. 
Row 9 reports the estimates with 5 educational groups instead of 4 for 1982-1999 as in this 
period we can distinguish individuals with some years of college (two or three years of tertiary 
education) and college graduates (at least four or five years of education). Compared to the 
benchmark regression, the coefficients are now smaller and non-significant, although still 
positive. Next, Rows 10 and 11 check whether the results are robust to the consideration of only 
                                                 
12 The proportion of natives paid at the minimum wage plus 5% peaks at 87.3% in 1999 for the individuals with primary education and 
experience level 1-5, increases rapidly over time, and is generally non negligible among the least educated for all experience levels and 
the least experienced for the all education levels. Instead, the share is systematically below 5% for individuals with at least high school 
education and more than ten years of experience. A table presenting the share of workers paid at the minimum wage across 
education/experience cells is available upon request.  
12 
two broad educational groups. 13
Given that our initial set of fixed effects might be insufficient to eliminate biases, Row 12 
includes the interaction between education, year and newly-constructed ten-year experience 
cells
 Specifically, regression 10 pools together primary and 
secondary education, on the one hand, and high-school graduates and college graduates, on the 
other, while regression 11 pools together all education groups but the college graduates. In both 
specifications, the coefficient on wages remains positive and significant while the impact on 
employment is smaller and statistically insignificant. 
14
Overall, we find evidence of a positive correlation between the immigrant share and wages 
or employment, and this result is shown to be quite robust to various alternative sample 
constructions and specifications of the model. 
 to account for time-varying group-specific unobserved labor demand shocks. This 
results in a substantially larger coefficient for wages and lower and statistically insignificant 
coefficients for both employment variables. As Row 12 includes 112 fixed effects for 160 
observations, which might be excessive, Row 13 reduces the number of fixed effects by 
interacting the 10-years-experience cells and time only with the broad education groups defined 
in regression 10. The results are found to be comparable to those of the baseline model, but with 
a substantially larger coefficient on wages (0.41 instead of 0.33). 
2.2 Regional estimates 
As the identification of the aggregate model might be biased if the immigrant share is 
endogenous, we now report estimates based on geographical variation across 21 French 
metropolitan regions.15
                                                 
13 In the case of the U.S., Card (2009) argues that, a model with four groups of education (high-school dropouts, high-school graduates, 
individuals with some college, and college graduates) as in Borjas (2003) does not fit well the data.  
 The main interest in using the geographical approach is that we can use 
the proportion of co-nationals in the region as an instrument for future immigrant inflows, as 
e.g. in Card (2001). Clearly, this instrument might not completely solve the endogeneity 
14 More precisely, we define cells of 1-10, 11-20, 21-30, and 31-40 years of experience. 
15 We exclude Corsica from the sample, as it represents only 0.5% of the French population. 
13 
problem. Indeed, serial correlations might create persistent correlations between location 
choice and economic outcome, which would invalidate the excludability restrictions of the 
instrument. In addition, as discussed by Borjas (2003), natives may respond to immigrant 
inflows by moving out to other locations, which would diffuse the impact of migration across 
locations. 
To construct the instrument, we follow a standard ‘shift-share’ approach. Let C  denote 
the immigrant’s country of origin and 0t  a reference year. Then, one can predict the region- R  
number of immigrants with education/experience ( , )i j  for year t  ( ˆ ijtRM ) as:  
 ,ˆ ijtR CR C ijt
C
M Mλ=∑  
where ,C ijtM  is the total number of immigrants from country C with education level i  and 
experience level j residing in France in year t 16 0
0
,
,
CR t
CR
C t
M
M
λ = and  is the share of country-C  
immigrants in region R  in the reference year 0t . 
Given our large sample size, we distinguish groups of immigrants by using the 
maximum number of nationalities available, namely the 54 different countries of birth which 
are always reported separately across censuses. We construct two versions of this instrument. 
The first version uses 1968 as the reference year for all censuses, while our second version uses 
the lagged census year as a reference year.17
 
 Our instrument is then simply computed using the 
predicted number of migrants and the number of natives i.e.  
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ijtR
ijtR
ijtR ijtR
M
p
M N
=
+
 
                                                 
16 Following Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2010), we construct CRλ  with data from immigrants of all education and experience levels in 
order to allow for a greater role of geography and ethnic networks. In doing so, we hope to avoid the results being driven by economic 
factors that might attract workers with specific education/experience levels to specific regions. 
17 The two versions are likely to be quite different given that the stock of immigrants in 1968 comes mainly from Europe and the Maghreb, 
while post-1970s immigration comes also from Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, in some sense, the first version of the 
instrument uses traditional long run immigrant flows while the second instrument is related with more recent immigrant waves. 
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where the number of natives ˆ ijtN  is predicted by using the total number of individuals in the 
region and the share of group i  and j  in the population at the national level in that year. 
Table 4 reports WLS and IV regional level estimates. Following Borjas (2003), we 
estimate models with alternative sets of fixed effects which should absorb the impact of 
regional labor demand shocks. Specifically, Panel A’s regressions include controls for each 
possible two way interactions and fixed effects between education, experience, region and year, 
while Panel B’s regressions also include controls for an effect of region by education and by 
experience. Finally, in Panel C, we use region year fixed effects interacted with either 
experience or education fixed effects, as in Cortes (2008). These fixed effects account for 
region by education or region by experience specific factors which could be correlated with 
immigrant inflows. 
Table 4 shows the immigrant share to be strongly and positively correlated to employment 
rates at the regional level independently of the specific fixed effects included. The correlation 
with wages is generally positive but becomes significant only in some cases, as in Panels B and 
C when introducing additional fixed effects. Also, as in Borjas (2003), the value of the 
estimated coefficients is greatly attenuated relative to national level estimates, with e.g. the 
coefficient of the impact of the immigrant share on wages falling from 0.33 at the national level 
to about 0.12 in the WLS estimates in Panel A. 
3 Immigration and Occupations within Education/Experience 
Cells 
As underlined in the existing literature,18
                                                 
18 See in particular Peri and Sparber (2009), Manacorda et al. (2012) or Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica (2011).  
 natives and immigrants are likely to be imperfect 
substitutes in production. For this reason, this section studies the extent to which the positive 
15 
correlation between wages and immigration in France can be explained by an imperfect 
substitutability of immigrants and natives within education/experience cells. 
Consider a simple version of the Autor et al. (2003) model whereby output within each 
education/experience cell is a combination of two inputs –routine and nonroutine labor- which 
are q-complements. Assume that natives are heterogeneous in their productivity in the 
nonroutine occupation –i.e. they provide a different number of efficiency units of the input - 
and self-select across occupations à la Roy (1951). In addition, to keep things simple, assume 
that all immigrants work in the routine occupation since routine tasks do not require many 
interactive and communication skills. Finally, assume that firms are willing to hire as many 
immigrants as present in the market, and that there is an exogenous immigration shock. 
In this simple model, the arrival of immigrants initially depresses the wage in the routine 
task because of the additional supply of labor in this task and raises the wage in the nonroutine 
task given the q-complementarity between the two tasks. As a result, some natives shift from 
the routine towards the nonroutine occupation, which raises the wage in the routine occupation 
and lowers the wage in the nonroutine occupation until a new equilibrium is found. At the new 
equilibrium, the moderating effect resulting from the reallocation of natives across tasks is 
dominated by the effect of the initial immigration shock, and as a result the wage in the routine 
task ends up falling, while the wage in the nonroutine task increases. However, the wage per 
worker in the nonroutine task can end up being higher or lower –as the natives entering the 
nonroutine task after immigration are less efficient than those performing it initially- and the 
average native wage can also end up being higher or lower.19
Several assumptions or results of this simple model can be empirically tested. First, if the 
results in the previous section reflect an endogenous specialization of natives across tasks 
following immigration, one should find that natives are more likely to work in occupations 
 
                                                 
19 The full details of this simple extension of the Autor et al. (2003) model can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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different from those of immigrants when there are more immigrants in the education/experience 
cell. To this purpose, section 3.1 checks whether the relative distributions of natives and 
immigrants across occupations tend to be more dissimilar when the immigrant share increases. 
Second, for this reallocation to have a positive effect on wages, natives should be more 
likely to work in tasks which are complement to the routine tasks performed by immigrants 
when the immigrant share increases. For this, section 3.2 investigates how the relative task 
contents of natives and immigrants’ occupations are related with the immigrant share in the 
cell.  
Third, if this theoretical framework is relevant, occupational reallocation within 
education/experience cells should explain a significant part of the positive effect of 
immigration on wages found in section 2. For this, section 3.3 decomposes the changes in 
natives’ wages into changes associated to the reallocation of natives across occupations within 
the cell and changes in the wages for a constant occupational distribution. As the impact of 
immigration on the wages of nonroutine native ‘stayers’ in the model is ambiguous, our model 
does not predict whether a higher immigration share should be positively or negatively 
correlated to natives’ wages for a given occupational distribution. Instead, as the wages of 
natives moving from routine to nonroutine occupations unambiguously rise with immigration, 
one should expect that the immigrant share is positively correlated to the changes in the wages 
of the occupational ‘movers’. 
Finally, in section 3.4, we estimate models using the wages and characteristics of 
occupations of already established immigrants as the dependent variable. The previous 
literature (e.g. Cortes, 2008) has found that recent immigrants are closer substitutes to previous 
immigrants than to natives. For this reason, we would expect the effect of changes in the 
immigrant share on the wages of already established immigrants to be negative or at least less 
positive than for natives. 
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3.1 Congruence Index across Detailed Occupations 
We first investigate whether the occupational distribution of natives and immigrants within 
education/experience cells differs more when more immigrants are present in the cell. A way of 
measuring the similarity of the distributions is to use Welch (1999)’s index of congruence given 
by 
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where nkq  (resp. fkq ) denotes the proportion of natives (resp. immigrants) in occupation k  
and kq  gives the proportion of the workers in occupation k.  
Table 5 presents the congruence index computed using the 1990 census for given 
educational groups (see Appendix Table 1 for the values in the other census years). Just as for 
the U.S. and in contrast with the results for Germany,20
While the congruence index indicates that the distributions of natives and immigrants are 
not very different, our aim is to check whether the level of similarity is related to the share of 
immigrants in the cell. For this, we simply regress the congruence index of the two distributions 
on the immigrant share including the previously described set of fixed effects. If immigrants 
and natives are perfect substitutes, the congruence index should be uncorrelated to the 
immigrant share since in this case immigrants and natives always compete for the same jobs 
independently of the share of immigrants in the cells. Instead, if natives have comparative 
 the congruence indexes in France 
indicate similar patterns of relative specialization. Immigrants and natives with the same level 
of education and experience have generally occupational distributions which are more 
(positively) correlated than the distributions of immigrants and natives with the same education 
but different experience. 
                                                 
20 See respectively Borjas (2003) [table 2 p. 1346] and Steinhardt (2011) [table 2 p. 14]. 
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advantages for some occupations, we should find a negative correlation between the 
congruence index and immigration as immigrants enter in this case occupations different from 
the occupations of natives. 
The first column of Table 6 presents national level estimates for the entire period, while 
columns (2) to (5) use regional variations for 1975-1990, the period in which regional data is 
available. The parameter estimate at the national level indicates a strong and significant 
negative correlation between the congruence index and the immigrant share. At the regional 
level, the WLS estimates (columns 2 and 4) are still negative and significant, but smaller in 
magnitude. However, IV estimates using the settlement patterns of immigrants as instruments 
for the number of immigrants (columns 3 and 5) are larger and quite close to the national level 
estimate. 
The estimated effects are substantial. In Column 1, the national level estimates imply that 
an increase of 10 p.p. of the immigrant share in the cell lowers by 0.12 the congruence index. 
When the index is 0.7, as often the case among immigrants and natives with the same level of 
experience and primary or college education, this corresponds to a decrease of the congruence 
index by 17%. 
3.2 Task Contents 
In order to explore how natives and immigrants specialize across occupations, we now 
empirically test whether the type of tasks performed by natives within each 
education/experience cell depends on the ratio of immigrants to natives in the cell. We use three 
measures of task characteristics ("abstract task importance", "routine task importance", and 
"routine task intensity") computed by Goos, Manning and Salomons (2010) [Table 4 p. 49] with 
data from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) and manually match them with 
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French occupational classifications. 21  To facilitate the interpretation of the results, the 
measures of task intensity are normalized such that their weighted average across cells is 0 and 
the standard deviation is 1, using the number of native workers as weights. Abstract task 
intensity rates highest among Corporate Managers (3.6) and Engineers (3.2) and lowest for 
Service Elementary Occupations (-1.6). As for routine importance, this ranges from Plant 
Operators (3.2) to Service Elementary Occupations (-0.23) and Corporate Managers (-2.8).22
Table 7 regresses the average intensity of the tasks performed by natives in 
education/experience cells against the immigrant share, both at the national and regional level. 
Subpanel 1 shows that a higher presence of immigrants in the education/experience cell is 
positively related to the natives performing more abstract-intensive tasks, although the 
coefficient is not significant at the national level. In addition, across specifications, the routine 
task importance (resp. intensity) of the occupations performed by natives is negatively and 
strongly correlated to the presence of immigrants in the cell, as shown in subpanel 2 (resp. 
subpanel 3). 
 
Quantitatively, depending on the specification, an increase of 10 p.p. of the immigrant share 
raises abstract task importance by about 2 to 4%, lowers routine task importance by 7 to 15% 
and routine task intensity by 4 to 9% of a standard deviation. 
In turn, Table 8 shows what happens when we consider instead the task intensity of the 
occupations of natives relative to those of immigrants. For all task measures, the coefficients 
are much larger than the coefficients for the task intensity of natives only, which indicates that 
the average task intensity of jobs performed by immigrants across occupations also varies with 
the share of immigrants. Specifically, we find that an increase in 10 p.p. of the immigrant share 
raises relative abstract task importance by 7 to 18%, lowers the relative routine task importance 
                                                 
21Abstract tasks are "complex problem solving" tasks, while routine tasks require either repetitive strength/motion or non-complex 
cognitive skills, and do not thus require good language skills. Finally, "routine task intensity" is based on an index defined as routine task 
importance divided by the sum of abstract and service task importance. See Goos et al. (2010) [p.18-19] for details on data construction. 
22Abstract and routine task importance measures are negatively correlated but the coefficient is only equal to -0.5 because several 
occupations in the service sector combine a low level of abstract tasks with a low level of routine tasks. 
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by 15 to 27%, and lowers routine task intensity by 9 to 17% of the standard deviation of the task 
distribution in the population.23
Overall, natives perform more abstract than routine tasks in cells with higher number of 
immigrants relative to natives– both in absolute terms and relative to immigrants. In addition, 
the results in this subsection show that the presence of immigrants in education/experience cells 
is strongly correlated with the natives in those cells performing less routine and more abstract 
tasks.  
 
3.3 Decomposition of Natives’ Wages 
Let kijtw  denote the average wage of individuals from cell ( , , )i j t  working in occupation k  
and kijts  denote the share of workers from that cell working in occupation k . The average 
wage in cell ( , , )i j t  can be written as:  
 k kijt ijt ijt
k
w s w=∑  
Then, changes in the wages of natives over time in an education/experience cell following an 
immigration inflow can be decomposed into changes in the distribution of natives across 
occupations and changes in their wages within occupations, i.e.  
 1 , 1 , 1 1( ) ( )
k k k k k k
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k k
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If immigrants have an impact on the occupational distribution of natives, then , 1
k k k
ijt ij t ijts s s−− ≡ ∆  
may be a function of the immigrant share. 
The decomposition in (2) can be empirically implemented by constructing two 
counterfactual series using the reweighting procedure in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996). 
                                                 
23 We have also estimated separately the relationship between immigrants’ task intensity and the number of immigrants (not reported).As 
suggested by the results in Table 8, we find that in cells with higher number of immigrants relative to natives, immigrants tend to work in 
occupations with less abstract tasks, more routine task and more routine task intensity. These results are available upon request.  
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Specifically, let 0( , )ijt tw w s  denote the series constructed with the actual shares holding wages 
constant at their reference year 0t  level, i.e.  
 
00 , ,
( , ) k kijt t ij t ij t
k
w w s s w=∑  
and 0( , )ijt tw w s  denote the series constructed with the actual wages holding shares constant, 
i.e.  
 
00 ,
( , ) .k kijt t ij t ijt
k
w w s s w=∑  
Given the relatively small number of observations for wages corresponding to certain 
education/experience cells, our counterfactual wage distributions across occupations can only 
be constructed if we choose a relatively parsimonious definition of occupations, namely the 
basic professional status whereby workers are classified as white-collar worker, technician, or 
blue-collar worker.  
Panel A in Table 9 regresses 0( , )ijt tw w s  on the immigrant share and the usual set of fixed 
effects for different reference years. For all reference years, higher wages coming from the 
reallocation of natives towards better paid occupations are positively correlated with the 
presence of immigrants in the corresponding education/experience cell, which corresponds to 
the prediction of our model. The decline in the coefficient in the recent period reflects in a large 
part the decrease in the wage gap between occupations observed in France over the period. 
Quantitatively, a 10% increase in the share of immigrants in a cell is associated to an additional 
reallocation of natives across occupation generating a 1.5% to 3% increase in native wages 
depending on the reference year. As the overall impact of a 10 p.p. increase in the immigrant 
share is 3.3% (see Table 3), these results suggest that native reallocation across occupations 
accounts for a large part of the overall impact.  
Next, Panel B in Table 9 shows that counterfactual fixed-occupation wages 0( ( , ))ijt tw w s  
are also positively correlated to the immigrant share, although to a slightly lower extent than 
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0( ( , ))ijt tw w s . The impact is also large, the effects of a 10 p.p increase in the immigrant share 
being correlated with an increase in native wages from 3% to 1.7% at constant distribution 
across occupations. Given that in our framework the effect of immigration on the wages of the 
occupational ‘stayers’ is ambiguous, this result is not incompatible with the model. However, 
as the size of the effect is large, this may also indicate the existence of positive demand shocks 
affecting the price of labor that are imperfectly absorbed by the fixed effects. 
3.4 The Impact of Immigration on Already Established 
Immigrants 
 
As a final test, we estimate models using wages and occupations of already established 
immigrants as the dependent variable.24
The other regressions investigate how variations in the immigrant share influence the 
occupations of already established and new immigrants. We find that the occupations of already 
established immigrants are more likely to differ from those of new immigrants in cells with a 
larger immigrant share, which goes qualitatively in the same direction as the results for natives 
relative to immigrants. The coefficients are however much smaller than those obtained in 
similar regressions for natives (see row 1 in Table 11). Specifically, for both the congruence 
 Already established immigrants are more likely to 
compete with other immigrants than natives and, as a result, their wages should in principle 
respond negatively to the variations of the immigrant share. At the same time, if our previous 
results were completely driven by a bias which also affected the wages of already established 
immigrants, we would instead expect a positive coefficient. Reassuringly, column 1 in Table 10 
shows that, in contrast with natives, the coefficient of the impact of the immigrant share on the 
wages of already established immigrants is negative but quite small and statistically 
insignificant. 
                                                 
24 As there is no arrival year in the data before the 1999 Census, we distinguish these two groups of immigrants by using a variable 
indicating the location at the date of the previous census. New immigrants are those who reported to be living abroad at the time of the 
previous census. Note that the definition of the immigrant share remains unchanged and includes all immigrants and natives. 
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index and the relative routine importance, the coefficient is divided by 10, and it is not actually 
statistically significant for the congruence index. For relative abstract importance, the 
coefficient decreases to a lower extent. 
Overall, these results reinforce our conclusion that workers in education/experience 
cells are imperfect substitutes. Indeed, in addition to the imperfect substitution results between 
natives and immigrants in section 3.1 to 3.3, this section shows that already established 
immigrants and new immigrants are also imperfect substitutes. These results also suggest that 
recent immigrants compete in particular segments of the labor market, both with respect to 
already established immigrants and, to a lesser extent, with respect to natives (see Dustmann, 
Frattini and Preston, 2013). 
4. What explains the differences between France and the U.S.? 
As shown in Section 2, there is a stark contrast between Borjas (2003)’s estimates for the U.S. 
and our estimates for France using exactly the same approach. 
In explaining this contrast, the imperfect substitutability results of the previous section 
might not be the full story for two reasons. First, using a different approach, Ottaviano and Peri 
(2012) shows that the U.S. is also characterized by imperfect substitutability within 
education-experience cells and Peri and Sparber (2009) shows that U.S. low skilled natives and 
immigrants specialize in different tasks. While the extent of this imperfect substitutability 
might be different in the two countries, it seems unlikely that this potential differential alone 
can drive the elasticity of natives’ wages with respect to the immigrant share from 3% to -3%. 
Second, the decomposition of natives’ wages in subsection 3.3 shows that the size of the impact 
of immigration on natives’ wages holding the occupational distribution constant is pretty large. 
This result is a little bit surprising given that the positive impact of immigration on wages 
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through q-complementarity should anyway be (at least partly) offset by the downward pressure 
on wages stemming from the inflow of natives into nonroutine occupations.  
During the period under consideration, France and the U.S. had contrasting evolutions 
in the educational attainment of their labor forces, as illustrated by Figure 3: indeed, while the 
relative supply of young skilled workers remained pretty stable for the U.S. after 1975, it 
increased importantly for France in the same period (see also Table 1 for France)25 and this 
evolution was accompanied by a large decline in the skill premium (Verdugo, 2014). To check 
whether accounting for the changes in the educational attainment of natives changes the 
correlations between immigration and wages or occupations in France, regressions 2 and 3 in 
Table 11 include the log of natives in the education/experience cell as an additional regressor. 
In both regressions, the log of natives is found to be negatively correlated to both the wage of 
natives (column 1) and the relative abstract importance of tasks (column 3). Importantly, 
controlling for the log of natives reduces by roughly one third the magnitude of the estimated 
effect of the immigrant share on wages in regression 2 (from 0.33 in the baseline model to 
0.201) and makes it statistically insignificant in regression 3.26
As illustrated by Figure 4, which puts together data from the French censuses and 
information in Figure 1. A in Borjas (2003, p. 1342), France and the U.S. also differ in the 
timing of low-educated immigration. Specifically, the immigration shock in the U.S. takes 
mainly place –for all education groups, but especially for the low-educated- in the 1980s and 
the 1990s, which are a period of widening wage inequality. In contrast, in the case of France, 
 For the U.S., controlling for the 
log of natives does not change much the impact of immigration on log weekly earnings (see 
Table 3 p. 1351 in Borjas, 2003), which is probably related to the relative stability in natives’ 
educational attainments. 
                                                 
25 Skilled workers are defined as individuals with more than high-school education for the U.S. and having either high-school or university 
education for France. 
26 Since ln / (1 / )( ln / ln )w m m w m∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂  and the mean value of m is 9%, the elasticities corresponding to estimates in row 3 
can be obtained by multiplying the coefficients by 11.1, assuming the number of natives fixed. 
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the largest inflows of low-educated immigrants were observed in the 1960s and 1970s, at the 
beginning of a significant compression of the wage distribution, characterized by large positive 
demand shocks, rapid wage growth and declining inequality, with both the real average wage 
and the minimum wage experiencing 4% annual increases during the first-half of the 1970s 
(Cette, Chouard and Verdugo, 2013). To check the characteristics of the estimates in such a 
high-immigration high-wage-growth environment, we estimate in Rows 4 and 5 the model 
separately for the period before and after the 1975 census. For the three measures of the 
characteristics of the occupations, the coefficients have the same signs and similar magnitudes 
in the pre-1975 period compared to the entire period (Row 1) or the post-1982 period (Row 5). 
This suggests that the imperfect substitution within education/experience cells identified in 
section 3 is a common feature of both periods. Instead, for wages, the pre-1975 regression 
delivers a very large and significant coefficient (0.927), which clearly shows that in this type of 
environment the model fails to capture the impact of immigration on natives’ wages. In 
contrast, post-1982, the coefficient is half the baseline coefficient and statistically insignificant. 
These differences suggest that one of the reasons for which the baseline coefficient for France 
differs from the results for the U.S. may be that the Borjas (2003) model does not perform well 
in the changing environment characterizing France in this period, as the time fixed-effects 
included in the model seem to be absorbing only imperfectly the demand shocks. 
5 Conclusion 
Following the literature initiated by Borjas (2003), we have chosen education/experience as the 
dimension along which natives and immigrants are assumed to be similar. When doing so for 
France with very large Census extracts, we have found a positive impact of immigration on the 
wages and employment of natives. This result has been shown to be robust to the introduction 
of a geographical dimension to education/experience cells. 
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We have also provided evidence along different lines that the positive correlation 
between immigration and wages is partly due to the imperfect substitutability of natives and 
immigrants within education/experience cells. Indeed, tasks and occupations, and not only 
education and experience, seem to be very important dimensions in the French labor market. 
Taking this reasoning one step further, this raises the question - clearly beyond the scope of this 
paper- of whether tasks and/or occupations are not actually in France a dimension as (or more) 
relevant than education and experience in defining whether natives and immigrants are 
competing with each other or not. 
The paper also stresses that imperfect substitutability is unlikely to be the full explanation 
for the large positive correlation between immigration and natives’ wages in France. Indeed, 
parallel to the arrival of unskilled immigrants until the mid 1970s, the French economy 
experienced a compression of the wage distribution –with lower inequality in the bottom end- 
and an important increase in the educational level of natives, and we show evidence that part of 
the positive coefficient is related to the inability of the Borjas (2003) model to fully account for 
this. In addition, although our regional analysis presents evidence in the opposite direction, we 
cannot really rule out that in this period immigration was actually at least partly driven by the 
structural changes characterizing the French labor market.  
Overall, our analysis casts some doubts on the performance of the Borjas (2003) model in 
countries/periods of time characterized by larger changes in the structure of the labor market 
not likely to be directly driven by immigration. Our ongoing research (Ortega and Verdugo, 
2013) attempts to overcome some of these limitations by focusing on more homogenous groups 
of workers using administrative panel data. 
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Appendix 1: Definition of the variables 
The number of natives and immigrants per education/experience cell are computed using 25% 
extracts of the French census in 1968, 1982, 1990, and 1999, and a 20% extract in 1974. 
Sampling weights are used in all the calculations. The analysis is restricted to men aged 18-64. 
A person is defined as an immigrant if he is a noncitizen or a naturalized French citizen born 
abroad. 
Education 
The education variable reported in the Census indicates the diploma received by the 
individual. We use the variable DIP in the 1968, 1975 and 1982 censuses, DIPL1 in the 1990 
Census and DIPL in the 1999 Census. We classify individuals in four education groups 
depending on their diploma: Primary education, Secondary education, High School and 
College. Primary education level includes individuals which declare to have no diploma and 
people having the primary school certificates (DFEO and CEP). Secondary education level 
includes individuals which report to have a diploma of a level equivalent to the Diplôme 
National du Brevet (BEPC) and includes individuals holding a CAP, a diploma of CAP level, a 
BEP, a BEPC, or a BEPS. High school education includes individuals who have a diploma 
equivalent to the Baccalaureate. This group also includes general, professional or technical 
Baccalaureate graduates, Brevet Professionnel graduates, Brevets de Technicien graduates, 
Brevets d’Enseignement Commercial, Industriel, Social, Hotelier, Agricole graduates, Brevet 
d’Agent Technique, BT and BA graduates. College level includes all individuals with a diploma 
of a level superior to the Baccalaureate which includes diplômes paramédicaux et sociaux, 
BTS, DUT, DEST, Diplômes d’université de Premier, Second et Troisième Cycle, Grandes 
Écoles, Écoles d’Ingénieurs, etc. 
Monthly Wages 
The data used to compute the average wage by experience level and educational level come 
from the 1970 et 1977 survey FQP (Formation et Qualification Professionnelle) and from the 
French labor force survey (LFS) of 1982, 1990 et 1999. The 1970 and 1977 FQP surveys 
provide information on the net annual income from work in 1969 and 1976. The LFS provides 
the net monthly income of the main reference profession of an individual at the time of the 
survey (April in 1982, January and February in 1990, and March in 1999).  
To compute the average wage per cell of experience and education, we include native 
individuals which report to be employed during the survey, which are wage earners and are 
employed by the private sector. Because there is no information on the country of birth in the 
1977 FQP, natives are defined as individuals who are natural born citizen. We exclude 
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independent workers and civil servants. In the 1982 LFS, there is no variable which 
distinguishes naturalized citizens from natural born citizens, therefore naturalized citizen born 
abroad which must be counted as immigrants are included in the sample (according to the 1982 
Census, the number of naturalized citizen born abroad is equivalent to 2% of the total number of 
male workers). In the 1982 LFS, for the average monthly wages, we impute 1000 for less than 
1000 Francs (F), 1250 for 1000-1499, 1750 for 1500-1999, 2250 for 2000-2499, 2750 for 
2500-2999, 3250 for 3000-3499, 3750 for 3500-3999, 4250 for 4000-4499, 4750 for 
4500-4999, 5500 for 5000-5999, 6500 for 6000-6999, 7500 for 7000-7999, 8500 for 
8000-8999, 9500 for for 9000-9999, 12500 for 10000-14999, 17500 for 15000-19999, 22500 
for 20000-24999, 27500 for 25000-29999, 45000 for 30000 F and more. 
There is no information on the precise number of hours worked in the FQP surveys. 
Therefore, we only retain individuals which declare to have been full time employed during the 
last twelve months in the year preceding the survey. In the LFS, we eliminate individuals which 
declare not to work full time during the survey week. Average monthly income is obtained from 
the FQP survey by dividing by 12 the net annual wage income from work. Monthly wages are 
converted in 2007 euros using the CPI deflator computed by the INSEE. The average log wage 
is obtained by computing the average of the log of the monthly wage over the relevant 
population. The final sample size used to compute these averages is 10993 for 1970 FQP, 
10906 for 1977 FQP, 21738 for 1982 LFS, 17512 for 1990 LFS and 19556 for 1999 LFS. The 
observations have been winsorized for each year.  
Geographical Instrument Based on Settlement Patterns of Immigrants  
We distinguish groups of immigrants by using 54 different countries of birth available 
across censuses. We assign other individuals (less than 5% of immigrants on average) into four 
regions of birth groups (Europe, Asia, Africa and Other). Because immigrants from some 
nationalities were very rare during the 1960s in France, particularly immigrants from Asia or 
subs-Saharan Africa, we compute two different instruments by using either 1968 or the year of 
the previous census as a reference year. The first instrument captures immigrants flow related to 
traditional ports of entry of immigrants in France while the second instrument predicts 
immigration using more recent settlement patterns and takes into account the location choice of 
nationalities not in France during the 1960s.  
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Figure 1 Immigrant Share per Education-Experience 1968-2000 
 
Notes: For each census year, the Figure reports the percentage of immigrants among workers with 
similar education level and labor market experience. The figures use the midpoint of each experience 
interval. Sources: Census of Population, 1968-1999. 
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Figure 2: Residual of low Wages versus Immigrant Share 
Men with experience between 1-40 
 
Note: The figure depicts the residuals of the immigrant share on fixed effects with the residuals 
of the log average wages on fixed effects. 
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Figure 3: Relative Supply of Skilled Labor for 26-30 year Old Men: 
France versus the US  
Source: For the US, the figure represents the log of the number of university equivalent workers 
over high-school equivalents workers from Card and Lemieux (2001, p. 723). For France, the 
figure represents the log of the number of university or high-school graduates over the number 
of workers with education inferior to high-school. The figures are normalized to zero in the 
base year for each country. The sample is restricted to male workers aged 26-30 years old. See 
Verdugo (2014) for details. 
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Figure 4: Immigrant Supply Shock in France vs the U.S. for low skilled workers 
Notes: For each census year and country, the Figure reports the percentage of immigrants 
among workers with labor market experience for High School Dropouts for the U.S. and 
workers with primary education in France. The figures use the midpoint of each experience 
interval. Sources: For France, Census of Population, 1968-1999. For the US, Borjas (2003, p. 
1342). 
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Table 1: Distribution of Educational Attainment in the French Population (percentage)  
  1968 1975 1982 1990 1999 
Primary School 68.3 56.5 50.2 39.5 24.5 
Secondary School 20.1 26.1 28.9 35.9 40.7 
High School 7.5 9.5 11.2 11.2 14.7 
College 4.2 7.8 9.7 13.4 20.1 
Notes: Tabulations include men aged between 18 and 64 years old, enrolled neither in school nor in 
military. Sources: Census of Population, 1968-1999. 
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Table 2: Log Monthly Wage of Full Time Male Native Workers Per Education/Experience 
Education Years of 
Experience 
1969 1976 1982 1990 1999 
Primary 1-5 6.60 6.41 6.84 6.66 6.49 
Education 6-10 6.88 7.06 6.98 6.93 6.91 
 11-15 7.01 7.21 7.09 7.02 7.02 
 16-20 7.03 7.30 7.18 7.11 7.11 
 21-25 7.11 7.30 7.24 7.18 7.15 
 26-30 7.11 7.30 7.25 7.26 7.19 
 31-35 7.13 7.28 7.24 7.26 7.27 
 36-40 7.12 7.24 7.24 7.23 7.34 
Secondary 1-5 6.85 6.65 6.92 6.85 6.67 
Education 6-10 7.08 7.22 7.09 7.02 7.01 
 11-15 7.23 7.39 7.25 7.16 7.13 
 16-20 7.35 7.52 7.37 7.26 7.23 
 21-25 7.44 7.56 7.45 7.35 7.31 
 26-30 7.53 7.57 7.49 7.44 7.37 
 31-35 7.46 7.57 7.48 7.46 7.44 
 36-40 7.57 7.66 7.52 7.45 7.48 
High 1-5 7.18 7.05 7.10 7.09 6.95 
School 6-10 7.43 7.52 7.35 7.23 7.12 
 11-15 7.64 7.78 7.55 7.42 7.34 
 16-20 7.71 7.80 7.70 7.59 7.53 
 21-25 7.86 7.96 7.82 7.69 7.62 
 26-30 7.81 7.95 7.85 7.75 7.64 
 31-35 7.84 8.01 7.80 7.78 7.75 
 36-40 7.82 7.96 7.90 7.78 7.84 
College 1-5 7.72 7.38 7.37 7.34 7.25 
Graduates 6-10 8.01 7.88 7.65 7.62 7.44 
 11-15 8.18 8.10 7.91 7.74 7.72 
 16-20 8.32 8.23 8.08 7.90 7.87 
 21-25 8.41 8.42 8.24 7.99 7.94 
 26-30 8.45 8.37 8.19 8.07 8.04 
 31-35 8.42 8.40 8.22 8.11 8.12 
 36-40 8.36 8.61 8.14 8.14 8.18 
Notes: The table provides the average log monthly wage of native men, working full time, per 
education/experience group. See text for details. The population excludes self-employed and civil 
servants. Wages are in 2007 euro, using the CPI computed by the INSEE. Sources: FQP 1964, 1970, 
1977 and LFS 1982, 1990, 1999. 
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Table 3: Impact of Immigrant Share per Education/Experience Cells 
Specification Av. Log Employment Employment N 
 Monthly wage Population Labor Force  
1. Basic Estimates 0.330*** 0.306*** 0.262*** 160 
 (0.107) (0.059) (0.045)  
2. Unweighted Regression 0.317** 0.426*** 0.303*** 160 
 (0.142) (0.141) (0.080)  
3. Population in ijtp  0.331*** 0.303*** 0.258*** 60 
 (0.108) (0.060) (0.046)  
4. Experience 0.270** 0.181*** 0.201*** 80 
between 11 and 30 (0.107) (0.026) (0.027)  
5. Only Primary 0.393*** 0.270*** 0.256*** 80 
and Secondary Education (0.115) (0.047) (0.042)  
6. Estimates without 0.306*** 0.305*** 0.248*** 120 
1-10 years exp. (0.108) (0.052) (0.032)  
7. Women and men in ijtp and 0.470*** 0.189  0.561*** 160 
in dependent variable (0.172) (0.137) (0.099)  
8. Women and men 0.186** 0.295*** 0.254*** 160 
in dependent variable (0.087) (0.057) (0.045)  
9. Period 1982-99 with 
college grad + some  0.205 0.104 0.027 120 
college distinction (0.128) (0.114) (0.095)  
10. Two skill groups  0.390* 0.0470 -0.048 80 
(High-school grad. in low skill group) (0.212) (0.193) (0.127)  
11. Two skill groups 0.456* 0.0190 -0.107 80 
(High-school grad. in high skill group) (0.273) (0.204) (0.124)   
12. Skill-year FE: 4 groups 0.580*** 0.030 0.043 160 
(112 FE) (0.137) (0.048) (0.039)  
13. Skill-year FE: 2 groups 0.410*** 0.250*** 0.236*** 160 
(87 FE) (0.117) (0.049) (0.042)  
Notes: The table reports the coefficient of the immigrant share from regressions for the above mentioned 
dependent variables for the period 1968-1999. Robust heteroscedastic standard errors reported in 
parenthesis are adjusted for clustering within education/experience cells. Controls (fixed effects) are 
added for education, experience, year, and for interactions between education and experience, year and 
experience, education and year. Weights are the number of observations per cell used to compute the 
average wage with the LFS or FQP divided by the total number of observations used to compute average 
wages per year. *, ** and *** denotes significant at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. Sources: 
Census of Population 1968-1999, FQP 1970, 1977 and LFS 1982, 1990, 1999.   
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Table 4: Regional Models 
Dependent variable: Log Wages Employment Rates 
Panel A. 
FE of reg x year ; educ x exp ; exp x year ;  
educ x year ; reg x educ ; expg x reg (314 FE) 
Immigrant Share 0.121 0.044 0.164*** 0.156*** 
 
(0.086) (0.120) (0.023) (0.034) 
First stage F 
 
171.9 
 
171.9 
Test of overid. 
 
0.94 
 
0.06 
restriction (p-value)   (0.33) 
 
(0.81) 
Panel B. 
Same as in A. and reg x educ x exp (732 FE) 
Immigrant Share 0.102 0.244* 0.150*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.099) (0.134) (0.027) (0.035) 
First Stage F 
 
203.2 
 
203.2 
Test of overid. 
 
1.25 
 
0.02 
restriction (p-value) 
 
(0.26) 
 
(0.894) 
Panel C. 
Same as in A. and reg x educ x year ; reg x exp x year (714 FE) 
Immigrant Share 0.128* -0.037 0.166*** 0.183*** 
 
(0.070) (0.109) (0.019) (0.032) 
First Stage F 
 
143.9 
 
143.9 
Test of overid. 
 
0.41 
 
0.41 
restriction (p-value) 
 
(0.52) 
 
(0.52) 
Estimation Method WLS IV WLS IV 
Notes: The number of observations is 2016. The table reports the coefficients from regressions 
with the indicated dependent variables using observations from the period 1975-1990. Controls 
(fixed effects) are added as indicated. Robust heteroscedastic standard errors reported in 
parenthesis are adjusted for clustering within region/education/experience cells. Weights are 
the number of observations per cell used to compute the average wage with the LFS or FQP 
divided by the total number of observations used to compute average wages per year. *, ** and 
*** denotes significant at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. Models in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 
are estimated using IV with the predicted immigrant inflows instruments based on 1968 
settlement patterns. See text for details. The F-Stat is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic. 
Sources: Census of Population 1968-1990, FQP 1970, 1977 and LFS 1982, 1990.  
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Table 5: Index of Congruence of Occupational Distributions within Education 
Group in 1990 
Note: The table reports the index of congruence across 123 occupations in 1990 
between natives and immigrants belonging to the same educational group. 
Source: 1990 Census. 
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 Experience of Immigrants 
 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 
College Graduates     
1-10 0.795 0.723 0.613 0.522 
11-20 0.639 0.794 0.847 0.771 
21-30 0.565 0.740 0.872 0.832 
31-40 0.531 0.724 0.880 0.874 
High School     
1-10 0.534 0.443 0.260 0.109 
11-20 0.130 0.337 0.453 0.407 
21-30 -0.065 0.203 0.499 0.557 
31-40 -0.068 0.150 0.485 0.605 
Secondary Education     
1-10 0.806 0.542 0.227 0.032 
11-20 0.444 0.664 0.549 0.351 
21-30 -0.144 0.319 0.545 0.554 
31-40 -0.329 0.113 0.426 0.551 
Primary Education     
1-10 0.782 0.612 0.539 0.530 
11-20 0.713 0.724 0.746 0.732 
21-30 0.339 0.466 0.577 0.564 
31-40 0.052 0.166 0.270 0.269 
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Table 6: Congruence Index and the Immigrant Share 
 Dependent variable :  Congruence Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Immigrant Share -1.244*** -0.861*** -1.014*** -0.922*** -1.126*** 
 (0.280) (0.234) (0.289) (0.114) (0.182) 
First-stage F   203.2  143.9 
Test of overid.   0.39  0.01 
restriction (p-value)   (0.53)  (0.92) 
N 160 2016 2016 2016 2016 
Level National Regional 
Method WLS WLS IV WLS IV 
(Educ x Exp x Reg) FE  Yes Yes No No 
(Reg x Educ x Year) and 
(Reg x Expg x Year) FE 
 No No Yes Yes 
Period 1968-1999 1975-1990 
Notes: This table regresses across education/experience cells the congruence index of 
occupations of natives versus immigrants against immigrant share. Each parameter refers to a 
different regression. Column 1 estimates the model across 32 education/experience cells at the 
national level for 1968-1999. Columns 2-5 perform the analysis across 672 
education/experience/region cells for 1975-1990. In Column 1, controls (fixed effects) are 
added for education, experience, year, and for interactions between education and experience, 
year and experience, education and year. In Columns 2 to 5, controls are the following 
interactions: reg x year ; educ x exp ; exp x year ; educ x year ; reg x educ ; expg x reg and the 
additional controls indicated in the table. Sources: Census of Population 1968-1999, FQP 1970, 
1977 and LFS 1982, 1990, 1999. 
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Table 7: Task Intensity of Natives and the Immigrant Share 
1. Dependent Variable:  Abstract Task Importance 
Immigrant Share 0.473 0.238*** 0.274*** 0.335*** 0.230 
 (0.381) (0.085) (0.090) (0.091) (0.130) 
First-stage F   203.2  143.9 
Test of overid.   0.16  7.10 
restriction (p-value)   (0.68)  (0.00) 
2. Dependent Variable:  Routine Task Importance 
Immigrant Share -1.528*** -1.404*** -0.678** -1.547*** -0.802** 
   (0.291) (0.210) (0.333) 
First-stage F   203.2  143.9 
Test of overid.   0.02  2.42 
restriction (p-value)   (0.88)  (0.12) 
3. Dependent Variable:  Routine Task Intensity 
Immigrant Share -0.895*** -0.818*** -0.429** -0.973*** -0.277 
 (0.263) (0.151) (0.201) (0.151) (0.221) 
First-stage F   203.2  143.9 
Test of overid.   2.08  4.56 
restriction (p-value)   (0.14)  (0.03) 
N 160 2016 2016 2016 2016 
Level National Regional 
Estimation Method WLS WLS IV WLS IV 
(Educ x Exp x Reg) FE  Yes Yes No No 
(Reg x Educ x Year) and 
(Reg x Expg x Year) FE 
 No No Yes Yes 
Notes: Each parameter refers to a different regression of the indicated dependent variable on the 
immigrant share. Column 1 estimates the model across 32 education/experience cells at the 
national level for 1968-1999. Columns 2-5 perform the analysis across 672 
education/experience/region cells for 1975-1990. In Column 1, controls (fixed effects) are 
added for education, experience, year, and for interactions between education and experience, 
year and experience, education and year. In Columns 2 to 5, controls are reg x year ; educ x exp 
; exp x year ; educ x year ; reg x educ ; expg x reg and the additional controls indicated in the 
table. Sources: Census of Population 1968-1999, FQP 1970, 1977 and LFS 1982, 1990, 1999.  
42 
Table 8: Task Intensity of Natives relative to Immigrants and the Immigrant Share 
1. Dependent Variable:  Abstract Task Importance 
Immigrant Share 1.873*** 1.049*** 1.299*** 1.131*** 0.740*** 
 (0.215) (0.203) (0.270) (0.153) (0.275) 
First-stage F   203.1  143.8 
Test of overid.   5.87  26.9 
restriction (p-value)   (0.01)  (0.00) 
2. Dependent Variable:  Routine Task Importance  
Immigrant Share -2.693*** -2.162*** -1.536*** -2.648*** -1.905*** 
 (0.540) (0.306) (0.344) (0.255) (0.418) 
First-stage F   203.1  143.8 
Test of overid.   0.028  25.16 
restriction (p-value)   (0.86)  (0.00) 
3. Dependent Variable:  Routine Task Intensity  
Immigrant Share -1.716*** -1.276 -0.943*** -1.740*** -1.015*** 
 (0.376) (0.279) (0.353) (0.219) (0.355) 
First-stage F   203.1  143.8 
Test of overid.   0.068  28.82 
restriction (p-value)   (0.79)  (0.00) 
N 160 2016 2016 2016 2016 
Level National Regional 
Estimation Method WLS WLS IV WLS IV 
(Educ x Exp x Reg) FE  Yes Yes No No 
(Reg x Educ x Year) and 
(Reg x Expg x Year) FE No No Yes Yes 
(Educ x Exp x Year) FE  No No No No 
Notes: Each parameter refers to a different regression of the indicated dependent variable on the 
immigrant share. Column 1 estimates the model across 32 education/experience cells at the 
national level for 1968-1999. Columns 2-5 perform the analysis across 672 
education/experience/region cells for 1975-1990. In Column 1, controls (fixed effects) are 
added for education, experience, year, and for interactions between education and experience, 
year and experience, education and year. In Columns 2 to 5, controls are reg x year ; educ x exp 
; exp x year ; educ x year ; reg x educ ; expg x reg and the additional controls indicated in the 
table. Sources: Census of Population 1968-1999, FQP 1970, 1977 and LFS 1982, 1990, 1999. 
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Table 9: Decomposition of the Evolution of Wages 
Reference year: 1968 1977  1982 1990 1999 
A. Dependent variable: Average Log Wages Constant Prices // Occupations varies 
Immigrant Share 0.302*** 0.206*** 0.160*** 0.164*** 0.147*** 
 (0.053) (0.059) (0.051) (0.043) (0.054) 
B. Dependent variable: Average Log Wages Constant Occupations // Price varies 
Immigrant Share 0.271*** 0.279*** 0.297*** 0.183*** 0.168*** 
 (0.067) (0.065) (0.073) (0.065) (0.063) 
N 160 160 160 160 160 
Notes: The table regresses counterfactual average log native wages for 
education/experience/time cells against the immigrant share and a set of fixed effects using 
observations for 1968-1999. Panel A's wages are constructed using the changes over time in the 
distribution of workers within education/experience cells across three basic occupations 
(white-collar, technician, and blue-collar) while holding wages at the 
education/experience/occupation level constant at the reference year level. Panel B's wages are 
constructed using the changes over time in education/experience/occupation wages holding 
constant the occupational distribution at the reference year level. Controls (fixed effects) are 
added for education, experience, year, and for interactions between education and experience, 
year and experience, education and year. Weights are the number of observations per cell used 
to compute the average wage with the LFS or FQP divided by the total number of observations 
used to compute average wages per year. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within 
education/experience cells. Sources: Census of Population 1968-1999, FQP 1970, 1977 and 
LFS 1982, 1990, 1999. 
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Table 10: Impact of the Immigrant Share on Already Established Immigrants (AEI) vs. New 
Immigrants (NI) 
 
Av. Log  
Monthly 
Wage of 
AEI 
Congruence 
Index 
(AEI/NI) 
Relative 
Abstract 
Importance 
(AEI/NI) 
Relative 
Routine 
Importance 
(AEI/NI)  
Immigrant share -0.060 -0.227 1.149*** -0.308**  160 
 (0.331) (0.315) (0.200) (0.150)  
Notes: The table reports the results from regression on the indicated variables using 
observations for 1968-1999. Controls (fixed effects) are added for education, experience, year, 
and for interactions between education and experience, year and experience, education and 
year. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education/experience cells. Weights are 
the number of observations per cell used to compute the average wage with the LFS or FQP 
divided by the total number of observations used to compute average wages per year. *, ** and 
*** denotes significant at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. Sources: Census of Population 
1968-1999, FQP 1970, 1977 and LFS 1982, 1990, 1999. 
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Table 11: Impact of immigration per Education/Experience Cells,  
Alternative specifications 
Specification 
Av. Log  
Monthly 
Wage 
Congruence 
Index 
Relative 
Abstract 
Importance 
Relative 
Routine 
Importance N 
1. Baseline results 
Immigrant Share 0.330*** -1.244*** 1.873*** -2.693*** 160 
 
(0.107) (0.280) (0.215) (0.540) 
 2. Controlling for the log of Native 
Immigrant Share 0.201* -1.395*** 0.940*** -1.286*** 160 
  (0.108) (0.261) (0.146) (0.198)   
Log Natives -0.066*** -0.076 -0.097** -0.090**    
  (0.022) (0.077) (0.041) (0.044)   
3. Separate Effects           
Log Immigrants 0.022 -0.194*** 0.110*** -0.145*** 160 
  (0.014) (0.027) (0.017) (0.023)   
Log Natives -0.086*** 0.081 -0.196*** 0.043   
  (0.022) (0.075) (0.032) (0.045)   
4. Period 1968-1975 only 
Immigrant share 0.927*** -1.272** 1.581*** -1.098*** 64 
  (0.291) (0.543) (0.321) (0.320)   
5. Period 1982-1999 only 
Immigrant share 0.150 -0.824 1.294*** -1.869*** 96 
  (0.136) (0.772) (0.256) (0.418)   
Notes: The table reports the results from regression on the indicated variables using 
observations for 1968-1999. Controls (fixed effects) are added for education, experience, year, 
and for interactions between education and experience, year and experience, education and 
year. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering within education/experience cells. Weights are 
the number of observations per cell used to compute the average wage with the LFS or FQP 
divided by the total number of observations used to compute average wages per year. *, ** and 
*** denotes significant at respectively 10%, 5% and 1% level. Sources: Census of Population 
1968-1999, FQP 1970, 1977 and LFS 1982, 1990, 1999.  
  
 
 
  
46 
Appendix Table 1: 
Index of Congruence of Occupational Distributions 
within Education Group 1968-1999 
 
1968 
 
1975 
Education/Experience  
of natives Experience of immigrants   
Education/Experience  
of natives Experience of immigrants 
 College Graduates 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40  College Graduates 1-10  11-20 21-30 31-40 
1-10  0.864 0.810 0.758 0.674 1-10 0.899 0.802 0.743 0.678 
11-20 0.810 0.825 0.838 0.834 11-20 0.870 0.874 0.857 0.796 
21-30 0.706 0.750 0.791 0.835 21-30 0.791 0.827 0.858 0.829 
31-40 0.632 0.683 0.728 0.781 31-40 0.738 0.756 0.805 0.816 
High School 
    
High School 
    1-10 0.724 0.645 0.377 0.211 1-10 0.683 0.655 0.437 0.415 
11-20 0.590 0.694 0.585 0.437 11-20 0.515 0.704 0.606 0.587 
21-30 0.411 0.629 0.696 0.611 21-30 0.335 0.685 0.740 0.758 
31-40 0.293 0.480 0.568 0.555 31-40 0.224 0.568 0.702 0.768 
Secondary Education 
    
Secondary Education 
    1-10 0.750 0.493 0.334 0.228 1-10 0.683 0.485 0.266 0.172 
11-20 0.594 0.502 0.487 0.378 11-20 0.457 0.393 0.287 0.279 
21-30 0.223 0.266 0.468 0.507 21-30 0.278 0.287 0.403 0.535 
31-40 -0.077 -0.009 0.209 0.409 31-40 -0.013 -0.024 0.149 0.449 
Primary Education 
    
Primary Education 
    1-10 0.485 0.382 0.312 0.272 1-10 0.713 0.610 0.538 0.488 
11-20 0.257 0.277 0.307 0.325 11-20 0.314 0.318 0.299 0.309 
21-30 0.044 0.106 0.202 0.316 21-30 0.240 0.241 0.258 0.380 
31-40 -0.073 -0.041 0.027 0.172 31-40 0.081 0.054 0.074 0.217 
 
1982 1999 
Education/Experience  
of native group Experience of immigrants 
Education/Exp. 
of native group Experience of immigrants 
 College Graduates 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 College Graduates 1-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 
1-10 0.833 0.778 0.618 0.453 1-10 0.833 0.630 0.483 0.371 
11-20 0.716 0.855 0.794 0.621 11-20 0.721 0.769 0.770 0.728 
21-30 0.641 0.821 0.839 0.664 21-30 0.480 0.699 0.842 0.855 
31-40 0.401 0.570 0.601 0.868 31-40 0.430 0.684 0.839 0.892 
High School 
    
High School 
    1-10 0.804 0.513 0.140 -0.091 1-10 0.793 0.477 0.062 -0.214 
11-20 0.274 0.559 0.520 0.266 11-20 0.166 0.233 0.263 0.214 
21-30 -0.200 0.216 0.548 0.438 21-30 -0.222 -0.100 0.194 0.345 
31-40 -0.298 0.054 0.400 0.623 31-40 -0.257 -0.197 0.150 0.405 
Secondary Education 
    
Secondary Education 
    1-10 0.553 0.416 0.244 0.035 1-10 0.863 0.578 0.267 0.132 
11-20 0.150 0.473 0.588 0.341 11-20 0.598 0.758 0.627 0.496 
21-30 -0.017 0.371 0.676 0.462 21-30 0.035 0.404 0.601 0.581 
31-40 -0.084 0.226 0.510 0.828 31-40 -0.302 0.037 0.399 0.480 
Primary Education 
    
Primary Education 
    1-10 0.896 0.615 0.544 0.510 1-10 0.819 0.589 0.487 0.425 
11-20 0.398 0.658 0.626 0.577 11-20 0.653 0.680 0.672 0.698 
21-30 -0.012 0.266 0.298 0.302 21-30 0.466 0.593 0.653 0.732 
31-40 -0.030 0.094 0.118 0.254 31-40 0.201 0.365 0.471 0.579 
Note: The table reports the index of congruence across 123 occupations between natives and 
immigrants belonging to the same educational group. Source: 1968, 1975, 1982, and 1999 
censuses. 
